evolutionarily stable strategy
ESS,
进化稳定策略
#game_theory
#game_theory
Definition
A mixed strategy in a two-player symmetric game is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if for every mixed strategy that differs from there exists such that, for all ,
where denotes the utility function for player 1
Application to dove-hawk population game
Theorem (symmetric Nash equilibrium)
If is an evolutionarily stable strategy in a two-player symmetric game, then is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game.
Theorem (condition for ESS)
A strategy is evolutionarily stable if and only if for each only one of the following two conditions obtains:
- , or
- (if a mutation deviates from , it will lose in its encounters with the normal population)
- and
- (if the payoff a mutation receives from encountering a normal individual is equal to that received by a normal individual encountering a normal individual, mutation will receive a smaller payoff when it encounters the same mutation than a normal individual would receive when encountering the mutation)
Corollary (strict symmetric equilibrium)
In a symmetric game, if is a strict symmetric equilibrium then is an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
(recall strict symmetric equilibrium means no player can change strategy without reducing payoff)
Notes
- Vincent et al. 2011 generalize ESS to evolutionary games governed by a system of ODEs
References
- M. Maschler, E. Solan, and Shmuel Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 190.
- Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18. https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0
- https://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/进化稳定策略
- https://knowledgehive.github.io/Game-Theory/lecture 12.html
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/
- Vincent, Thomas L., Tania L.S. Vincent, and Yosef Cohen. 2011. “Darwinian Dynamics and Evolutionary Game Theory.” Journal of Biological Dynamics 5 (3): 215–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/17513758.2010.526306.
- https://vknight.org/Year_3_game_theory_course/Content/Chapter_11_Population_Games_and_Evolutionary_stable_strategies/