Definition

A mixed strategy x∗x^* in a two-player symmetric game is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if for every mixed strategy xx that differs from x∗x^* there exists ϵ0=ϵ0(x)>0\epsilon_0 = \epsilon_0(x) > 0 such that, for all ϵ∈(0,ϵ0)\epsilon \in (0,\epsilon_0),

(1−ϵ)u1(x,x∗)+ϵu1(x,x)<(1−ϵ)u1(x∗,x∗)+ϵu1(x∗,x)(1-\epsilon) u_1(x, x^*) + \epsilon u_1(x,x) < (1-\epsilon) u_1(x^*, x^*) + \epsilon u_1(x^*, x)

where u1u_1 denotes the utility function for player 1

Application to dove-hawk population game

Theorem (symmetric Nash equilibrium)

If x∗x^* is an evolutionarily stable strategy in a two-player symmetric game, then (x∗,x∗)(x^*, x^*) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game.

Theorem (condition for ESS)

A strategy x∗x^* is evolutionarily stable if and only if for each x≠x∗x \neq x^* only one of the following two conditions obtains:

  • u1(x,x∗)<u1(x∗,x∗)u_1(x, x^*) < u_1(x^*, x^*), or
    • (if a mutation deviates from x∗x^*, it will lose in its encounters with the normal population)
  • u1(x,x∗)<u1(x∗,x∗)u_1(x, x^*) < u_1(x^*, x^*) and u1(x,x)<u1(x∗,x)u_1(x, x) < u_1(x^*, x)
    • (if the payoff a mutation receives from encountering a normal individual is equal to that received by a normal individual encountering a normal individual, mutation will receive a smaller payoff when it encounters the same mutation than a normal individual would receive when encountering the mutation)

Corollary (strict symmetric equilibrium)

In a symmetric game, if (x∗,x∗)(x^*, x^*) is a strict symmetric equilibrium then x∗x^* is an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.

(recall strict symmetric equilibrium means no player can change strategy without reducing payoff)

Notes

  • Vincent et al. 2011 generalize ESS to evolutionary games governed by a system of ODEs

References

  1. M. Maschler, E. Solan, and Shmuel Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 190.
  2. Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18. https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0
  3. https://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/进化稳定策略
  4. https://knowledgehive.github.io/Game-Theory/lecture 12.html
  5. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/
  6. Vincent, Thomas L., Tania L.S. Vincent, and Yosef Cohen. 2011. “Darwinian Dynamics and Evolutionary Game Theory.” Journal of Biological Dynamics 5 (3): 215–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/17513758.2010.526306.
  7. https://vknight.org/Year_3_game_theory_course/Content/Chapter_11_Population_Games_and_Evolutionary_stable_strategies/