Definition

A mixed strategy xx^* in a two-player symmetric game is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if for every mixed strategy xx that differs from xx^* there exists ϵ0=ϵ0(x)>0\epsilon_0 = \epsilon_0(x) > 0 such that, for all ϵ(0,ϵ0)\epsilon \in (0,\epsilon_0),

(1ϵ)u1(x,x)+ϵu1(x,x)<(1ϵ)u1(x,x)+ϵu1(x,x)(1-\epsilon) u_1(x, x^*) + \epsilon u_1(x,x) < (1-\epsilon) u_1(x^*, x^*) + \epsilon u_1(x^*, x)

where u1u_1 denotes the utility function for player 1

Application to dove-hawk population game

Theorem (symmetric Nash equilibrium)

If xx^* is an evolutionarily stable strategy in a two-player symmetric game, then (x,x)(x^*, x^*) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game.

Theorem (condition for ESS)

A strategy xx^* is evolutionarily stable if and only if for each xxx \neq x^* only one of the following two conditions obtains:

Corollary (strict symmetric equilibrium)

In a symmetric game, if (x,x)(x^*, x^*) is a strict symmetric equilibrium then xx^* is an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.

(recall strict symmetric equilibrium means no player can change strategy without reducing payoff)

Notes


References

  1. M. Maschler, E. Solan, and Shmuel Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 190.
  2. Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature246(5427), 15-18. https://doi.org/10.1038/246015a0
  3. https://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/进化稳定策略
  4. https://knowledgehive.github.io/Game-Theory/lecture 12.html
  5. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/
  6. Vincent, Thomas L., Tania L.S. Vincent, and Yosef Cohen. 2011. “Darwinian Dynamics and Evolutionary Game Theory.” Journal of Biological Dynamics 5 (3): 215–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/17513758.2010.526306.
  7. https://vknight.org/Year_3_game_theory_course/Content/Chapter_11_Population_Games_and_Evolutionary_stable_strategies/